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When Marianna Papastephanou first graciously invited me to participate in 
this workshop, I was not certain that I had much to contribute to what I was 
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certain would be a lively discussion. I had not much discussed prison 
literature as a cross-cultural phenomenon in my book The Prisoner’s 
Philosophy: Life and Death in Boethius’ Consolation.1
 There are many adulatory uses of and references to Consolation in 
modern literature that suggest that what we value in the book is not its 
 My concerns with 
the text were primarily literary and generic: What are the implications of 
expressing philosophical ideas in a neatly patterned prosimetric form as a 
Menippean satire, a genre that typically abuses the theorist who believes that 
his theories are sufficient to explain either human nature or the universe that 
contains it? But there is latent in the title of my book an idea that I never 
explored explicitly in print. By reference to the famous logical problem of 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, I encouraged the contemplation of this question: 
What is the prisoner’s best strategy for gaining his freedom? I would say that 
when the jailer gives you a choice, and it is a nasty choice, one that makes 
you work against your best interests by appealing to your worst instincts, 
why should you believe that the jailer is a man, or a woman, of his or her 
word? Why should you expect that the bargain would be kept? Why 
cooperate at all? Resistance, not acquiescence, may prove to be the more 
honorable path for any prisoner faced with merely logical choices.  
                                                 
1 Notre Dame 2007. My translation of Consolation is used throughout (Hackett; 
Indianapolis 2001). 
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philosophy (which is quaint and outmoded) but rather the courage of the 
philosopher who finds transcendence and comfort in an intellectual rejection 
of the injustices done to him by the tyrant Theoderic. But my argument 
today is that the real tyrant that the prisoner in Consolation resists is 
Philosophy herself; that it is Philosophy that would rob the prisoner of his 
voice; that Consolation celebrates the moral act of continuing to speak, and 
of continuing to write, in defiance of Philosophy, when Philosophy wants 
him to be silent and accept his death for her sake. 
 
A BIT OF HISTORY 
 
 Theoderic had the author imprisoned on a charge of treason in 524 
and then executed. Two points: first, it is not absolutely certain that 
Consolation was written in prison; second, and more important, Theoderic 
goes unnamed, even in the prisoner’s long and bitter account of his political 
activities in Book 1, Section 4, in which he says he tried to live up to the 
Platonic ideal of a philosopher-statesman. In Consolation, it was the defense 
of the Senate that got him in trouble, a Senate that did nothing to come to his 
rescue. He addresses the absent Senate venomously (1.4.36): “Would that no 
one could be convicted of such a crime ever again, Senators—you have 
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earned it!” As for the historical charge of treason, we ought to admit that that 
could have been true. To quote James O’Donnell: “[D]id no one . . .  dream 
of Boethius augustus?”2
 Philosophy’s reaction to the prisoner’s outburst at 1.4 is severe, 
unsympathetic, dismissive. The prisoner is to blame for his exile; only he 
could have do this to himself (1.5.2-3): “She said: When I saw you grief-
stricken and in tears I knew on the spot that you were a man to be pitied, an 
exile; but I would have had no idea just how far away your place of exile 
was had your set speech not given it away.  3. How great the distance is!  
Yet you have not been driven out of your fatherland; no, you have wandered 
away on your own or, if you prefer to think of yourself as driven out, it is 
rather you yourself who have done the driving—for such a power over you 
could never have been granted to anyone else.” 
 
 This is on the surface of the text, but it is worth stressing: Philosophy 
takes it upon herself to argue the prisoner out of his upset with the political 
maneuverings that have condemned him. She frequently speaks in her poems 
of the miseries of tyrants, the fears of tyrants, the contemptibility of tyrants; 
but never of the specific tyrant who imprisoned the prisoner. Somewhat less 
                                                 
2 Relihan, Prisoner’s Philosophy, p. 40, n. 28, from O’Donnell’s 1993 Bryn Mawr 
Classical Review of John Moorhead, Theoderic in Italy (Oxford 1992): “[D]id no one 
then  dream of Boethius augustus?  If not Boethius, who?  If Symmachus, then Boethius 
as son-in-law and heir is scarcely less important.  It is ironic that in our great reverence 
for the cloistered intellectual, we may have blinded ourselves to his true role in history.” 
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obvious is that Philosophy calls upon the prisoner to escape from his prison 
cell by flying away with her to his true homeland, but the prisoner refuses to 
follow her. Just as Philosophy trivializes the real tyrant by universalizing 
tyranny, she trivializes the prison experience by imagining escape as 
something other than escape—she is speaking of death. 
 It may not be true that the historical Boethius comes at the true end of 
the classical era, but it is true that Boethius the author depicts himself within 
the pages of Consolation as the last Roman poet, the last Roman patriot, the 
last true philosopher. He wants us to see him as the summation of many 
histories. So consider this arc that connects the beginning and end of 
antiquity: Achilles in his tent in Book 9 of the Iliad, Socrates in prison in 
Phaedo and Crito, and Boethius in prison in Consolation. In each, the 
isolated hero receives a guest or guests that urge escape; in each, the hero 
refuses to move; in each, the act of refusal is cast as obedience to inner 
principles and the rejection of what is expected. What is truly remarkable 
about Consolation is that the author has cast Philosophy herself (that is, 
upper-case, abstract Philosophy) as the force that must be rejected. And it is 
easy to overlook the fact that Consolation is about a book being written by 
one of the members of the dialogue. Achilles and Socrates are not authors 
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but Boethius is, and it is the creation of the book itself that is the historical 
author’s assertion of his freedom. 
 And so I return after many years to Ioan Davies’ Writers in Prison 
and his thoughts on Boethius.3
 At the end of Consolation, the prisoner, who had fallen silent after his 
objections in the fourth prose section of the final book and the poem that 
follows it, is finally invited by Philosophy not to travel to the realms above 
as she had wanted at first, not to view from a height the lives of others (and 
so discover that tyrants are the true exiles), but to view his own life through 
the eyes of God, so as to see that even the injustice of his imprisonment is 
part of the divine gaze. Davies does not see this as a matter of plot, but he 
 He does have a sense of the value of 
Menippean satire, and it is probably in appreciation of this that the book is 
“Dedicated to Mikhail Bakhtin’s cigarette papers.” Davies is quite 
illuminating when he says that Consolation is fundamentally about 
justification, not philosophy. Boethius “did not expect to be imprisoned, but, 
once he has been, his entire previous history must be rewritten to 
accommodate the fact, so that we are convinced that the previous history 
was a progression to this glorious moment” (46-47, emphasis in the 
original). 
                                                 
3 Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 
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does see the more general issues at stake. “Prison writing is about guilt, but 
about the ultimate guilt of not knowing whether one’s actions were locked 
into a world over which one had no control or into one’s self (which comes 
to the same thing). Prisoners . . . write to make sense to themselves and 
others of that predicament” (235). Boethius the author therefore presents the 
drama of the unjustly imprisoned statesman staying in the phenomenal 
world, in the world of experience, and learning its ultimate value. It is better 
to insist on the providential nature of one’s punishment than to be a 
wounded innocent. 
 And crucial to this drama is the fact that it is written down, that it has 
become a book. Philosophy never asked the prisoner to write; in fact, she 
enters the prison cell and practically has as her first act the banishment of the 
poetic Muses whose dictation the prisoner had been taking. She breaks off 
the act of writing at the beginning of Consolation; it can only be an author 
who has survived the confrontation with Philosophy, who has elected to stay 
in the world, who goes on to write Consolation. It is a subtle effect: when 
the author dramatizes a struggle between his imprisoned self and the Muse 
who created his earlier works (and Philosophy is certainly the Muse of 
philosophy and philosophers), he both destabilizes the writing process and 
makes his authorship an act of defiance. This too is congruent with a 
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conclusion drawn by Davies, but reached by another route: “[P]rison writing 
is self-reflexive. It is about trying to establish authorship (collective or 
individual) when that has been denied by the operation of the law. For most 
prison writing there is no evident author. . . .  Prison writing, from Boethius 
to Sarrazine, confronts the writing machine that commands, appropriates, 
spews out” (236). Philosophy tries throughout Consolation to control the 
content of the conversation and to redirect the prisoner and his thoughts, but 
it is the prisoner who fashions the end result. 
 Now it is notoriously difficult to keep distinct the three agents of 
Consolation: the prisoner, Philosophy, and the author who presents a 
confrontation between the two. The difficulty is heightened not only because 
Boethius the author invites us to identify him with Boethius the prisoner, but 
also because Philosophy presents herself as what the prisoner has always 
known. Her attempt to reeducate the prisoner is an attempt to make the 
prisoner more his true self by making him more like her, as if the goal of the 
book would then be the melding of prisoner, Muse, and author. But Davies 
often confuses this end goal—this unachieved goal, I might add—with the 
action that would lead up to it. The problem is this: Davies takes as the 
author’s essential orientation what is only the character Philosophy’s denial 
of the world. “[Boethius’] weakness, of course,” Davies says, “is the 
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weakness of refusing to confront the real and the self-evident, the rejection 
of desire which is surely the basis of our experience in the everyday prison 
that all of us encounter” (43). My point is that while Philosophy may deny 
the real, the prisoner does not, and the Consolation and Boethius the author 
do not. 
 The struggle for control of a work is a Menippean motif; and it is 
good now to lay out the other Menippean substrates of Consolation. There 
are three foundations for my reading of Consolation—the elements that led 
me originally to view it as a Menippean satire and that then led me to see the 
evolution and Christianization of the genre. The first is that when 
Philosophy appears to the prisoner, she comes from the Land of the Dead; 
she is a disrespected genre looking for a champion (this motif goes back to 
Old Comedy) and she is distressed to see that the prisoner is in no condition 
to be her champion; her goal is to re-educate him so as to prove her own 
value; she wants him to die because death proves the philosopher. The 
stronger remedies and the promised honey-rimmed bitter cup that 
Philosophy offers can only be Socrates’ cup of hemlock. The second is that 
when Philosophy wants the prisoner to fly out of the prison with her, her 
stated aim at the beginnings of Books 4 and 5, he refuses; he asks harder and 
harder questions, thus keeping her grounded, and keeping himself alive. He 
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resists the voyage to the other world. The third is that when the prisoner 
corners Philosophy on the question of free will and divine foreknowledge 
and gets her to admit that only a theologian can unravel that knot, he gets 
more than he bargained for. Consolation reveals the limits of Philosophy’s 
knowledge, the path that she cannot take, the truth that lies beyond her 
grasp, but the prisoner has traded the promised view from heaven, from 
which he would see that tyrants are the true exiles, for a consideration of 
God’s view from a height of him, the prisoner, whose unjust imprisonment is 
now part of God’s providential gaze. 
 Parody of philosophical, particularly Platonic, modes of discourse 
(dialogue, myth) is also Menippean, and this is at the heart of Consolation. It 
is easy to say that Phaedo is one of the pervasive influences in Consolation. 
Boethius, knowing that he is about to die, draws inspiration from the 
traditions concerning Socrates.4
 I will not summarize the action of Crito before this audience. Socrates 
imagines the laws and constitution of Athens appearing to him in his cell as 
he prepares to run away, and convincing him that flight would be 
 But it is Crito that offers parallels in action 
and in content. 
                                                 
4 But Phaedo certainly presents no parallel for the material of Consolation, even if in it 
we read of Socrates composing hymns in prison (Phaedo 60c-61b). Phaedo offers 
reasons why the soul must be immortal, and this is a question which never really arises in 
Consolation. 
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hypocritical and a rejection of the principles by which he had always lived.  
True to his habit, Socrates imagines an other-worldly voice that only 
dissuades him from a possible course of action. And the crucial parallel is 
this: the philosopher stays in prison, accepting the decision of his city.  The 
true philosopher is proved by his unwillingness to escape the consequences 
of his actions. 
 But Philosophy in Consolation does present the picture of life outside 
of the prison; or rather she hints at it, when, at the beginnings of Books 4 
and 5 she refers to the wings that she will attach to the narrator’s mind that 
will enable him to rise up and see his true home.  She wants the narrator to 
escape.  Boethius’s prisoner, like Socrates in Crito, will stay in his cell. But 
Socrates does so in obedience to his revelation, in order to die; Boethius’s 
prisoner does so in spite of his guide’s intentions, in order to live. 
Consolation is a parody, or, if you will, a travesty of Crito: the prisoner in 
effect refuses to drink the hemlock. And it is by this refusal that he shows 
himself to be a philosopher. 
 
THE PRISON-HOUSE OF POETRY 
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 I recently presented a reading of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy 
that posed this question: What if, instead of viewing the poetry of 
Consolation as discardable ornaments, as many readers and anthologizers 
are apt to do, we view the poetry as central, and the prose as commentary 
upon it?5
 “The reader coming to the Consolation for the first time—especially 
in David Slavitt’s uniquely evocative translation—should not be 
daunted by doctrinal debates or by the details of late antique history 
that shaped its making. Instead, the reader should savor the resonances 
of its verse: from the ruefulness of its opening meters in Book I, 
through the power of its natural descriptions in Book II, the purview 
of its cosmology in Book III, the affecting retellings of the tales of 
mythic heroes in Books III and IV, to the knowing serenity in Book 
V. . . .  The reader should attend as well to the prose dialogue that 
frames the poems” (xv; emphasis added). 
 Consider this remarkable statement from Seth Lerer’s introduction 
to the new Harvard Boethius (2008) by David Slavitt: 
 
But what I want to stress in this workshop is that this seriously misreads the 
poetry of Consolation. This speaks of a pattern of constant moral uplift, but 
the poetry is not unified, and it can only be read as uplifting to readers if the 
readers substitute themselves for a prisoner who is being elbowed aside. All 
                                                 
5 “The Consolation as Anthology with Commentary,” The Classics Renewed, Brown 
University, October 2011. 
Tyranny of Philosophy, page 13 of 18  
but four poems come from the mouth of Philosophy herself, but when the 
prisoner speaks in verse he has other agenda.6
 In that paper I reached the conclusion that Philosophy, in functioning 
as a poet, was consistently engaged in the act of taking the prisoner’s 
personal experience and universalizing it, stripping it of its particularities, 
and that the prisoner was trying to reclaim, and to hold onto, that experience. 
Philosophy’s New Muses are engaged not so much in making a unity of 
emotion and discursive thought, but in translating the prisoner’s bitter 
personal experiences into generic complaints that can be easily disposed of.
  
7
 But there are further limitations to what poetry can accomplish in 
Consolation, and the reader of Consolation as prison literature needs to 
realize that the author, even as he chooses to write, chooses to reveal what it 
  
                                                 
6 Many medievalists now see in the debate between Philosophy and the prisoner in 
Consolation the model for similar confrontations with such authority figures as Nature in 
Alan of Lille, Beatrice in Dante, Reason in Romance of the Rose, Church in Piers 
Plowman, confrontations in which the limits of the wisdom of the wisdom figure are 
stressed. The more that Consolation is seen as exploring the limits of Philosophy’s 
wisdom, the more that poetry becomes, not an element of Philosophy’s persuasiveness, 
but of her boundaries.  
7 Davies takes “translation” as the primary concern of prison writing, meaning the 
creation by the prisoner of new forms of discourse and communication when others had 
been denied. Davies’ chapter “The Consolations of Philosophy” comes close to making 
the point that there are at work in Consolation two competing forces: one directed 
outward, to the preservation of what the prisoner knows; one inward, toward a revelation 
of “the hidden self and ultimately the hidden god” (40). The outward self that is 
preserved is Boethius  the philosophical commentator, the man who in Book 5 is quoting 
from his own work on Aristotle’s On Interpretation; the hidden self is the one who 
discovers through his impasse with Philosophy herself that the value of his life lies in 
God’s contemplation of it; see The Prisoner’s Philosophy, p. 11, n. 34.  
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is that he cannot write. Some technical details are in order. There are 39 
poems in the five books of Consolation: 7 + 8 + 12 + 7 + 5. The first book 
begins with a poem and ends with one, while all the other books begin with 
prose. Every book ends with a poem, meaning that Consolation overall falls 
into a rhythm of prose-before-verse; every book, that is, except for the last 
book, where the absence of a final poem has always been a bit of a shock.8
                                                 
8 This is sometimes mistakenly seen as a sign of the physical incompleteness of the book, 
and we should certainly shy away from the romantic-slash-dramatic notion of Boethius 
interrupted in his work by the executioner’s knock on the door. 
 
There is then a curious symmetry between the first book and the last: the 
first has one poem too many, the last one too few (6+1, 8, 12, 7, 6-1). In fact, 
Book 1 begins with a poem that shouldn’t be there (it is dictated by the 
pagan Muses whom Philosophy dismisses and therefore constitutes a dismal 
false start) and Book 5, if you will allow me, ends with a poem that isn’t 
there; the lack of the final poem, so clearly expected by the rhythm of the 
whole work, indicates a pointed failure to achieve the reconciliation of 
prisoner and Philosophy. These bookends of Consolation are themselves 
statements about the proprieties and limitations of poetry: what is said in 
verse lies between what shouldn’t have been said and what cannot be said. I 
find this to be a valuable formulation. 
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 The prisoner speaks in verse only when there is a disturbance of the 
pattern of the verse, in Books 1 and 5. But there is still a patterning that 
binds all the poems together, by topic and by meter, so that the reader who 
has a chance to stand back from the individual poems and view the creation 
as a whole—I consciously echo here the language of the end of Book 5, in 
which Philosophy encourages the prisoner to look at the whole earth from 
God’s point of view—can see that the prisoner’s disturbance of the order is 
part of the order of the book. 
 It is therefore necessary to make some readjustments in our view of 
what it is that poetry does in Consolation. It is not the case that Consolation 
simply “is in prose and verse”; rather, the prisoner is more comfortable in 
the prose medium, and it is Philosophy who is showing off her range of 
poetic meters. Further, the prose is what documents the prisoner's attempt to 
assert the value of all his personal experience; the verse is Philosophy's 
constant attempt to take the personal and make it abstract. The prisoner is 
primarily a prose man; poetry therefore does not represent a union of 
intellectual and emotional approaches to Wisdom, but is Philosophy's 
medium for denying to the prisoner the particularities of his experience.9
                                                 
9 In other words, verse and prose only seem to be in parallel in Consolation as a whole; 
when we take it apart and put it back together again we see that the verse is a mechanism 
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 I would draw these conclusions: 
a) poetry is a medium that belongs primarily to Philosophy; 
b) poetry is a medium that suppresses the prisoner; 
c) poetry is not the emotional medium that stands in contrast to the 
rationality of prose and to discursive thought, but an abstract 
medium that stands in distinction to the physical circumstance of 
the prisoner;10
d) the poetry attempts to have meaning without reference to speakers; 
it tries to be universal; that is, it tries to find truths beyond the 
specific physical circumstances of the prisoner. 
 
 
The interruptions in the smooth flow of Philosophy’s argumentation come 
when the prisoner speaks in verse, and it is clear that the prisoner has trouble 
speaking in verse. He can’t find a way, in verse, either to let go of his earthly 
concerns or to express them. Neither the prisoner nor the author can in verse 
express his consent to the system that Philosophy tries to impose. Therefore, 
just as Consolation lacks a dedication, it lacks a conclusion. This documents 
                                                                                                                                                 
by which Philosophy takes the argument away from the particularities of the prisoner to 
an abstraction. 
10 One could say that what Philosophy’s poetry does best is to present the epic vision of 
the totality of the God-centered universe (3 m.9.27-28): “You are serenity, peace for the 
holy; their goal is to see you: You are their source, their conveyance, their leader, their 
path, and their haven.” 
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an impasse. As a personal dialogue, an internal dialogue, it doesn’t really 
want to go out into the wide world signed, sealed, and delivered. 
 And so we return to the beginning. Consolation documents the 
prisoner’s struggle to write a book. Philosophy herself did not encourage 
writing but offered the acceptance of silence, death, and the path of 
transcendence. The prisoner’s gambit is to keep Philosophy talking, to 
ground her, to keep her on earth. The philosopher who was scolded by 
Philosophy for his lament at his failure at being a philosopher-statesman 
here tries to keep Philosophy where she can do the most good, in the land of 
the living. This is the only moral act available to the prisoner. Socrates is 
said to have brought Philosophy down from heaven; Boethius through this 
drama does the same thing.  
 So why write poetry at all? What is the purpose of a prosimetric text 
whose verses represent a straitjacket on the thought? Menippean satire is at 
home in two worlds, and the one that the author’s heart is not in is the one 
that is described. He is forcing poetry to perform one task when there is a 
second task glimpsed but not dwelt on, not truly committed to paper. 
Philosophy, as the summation and encapsulation of both philosophic and 
poetic traditions, tries to impose form. But the very Menippean tradition of 
the mixture of prose and verse, which insists that it is fundamentally 
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incoherent to write in two media at once, examines, puts to the test, 
Philosophy’s claim to the total understanding of human life and thought. 
Boethius the author has offered his own experience not as the subject of 
poetry but as the objection to poetry. Philosophy cannot understand or 
accommodate him: poetry can’t either. 
 I would offer this, then, as a summation of all this. Boethius the author 
struggles to understand where his life fits into the scheme of things, now that 
his imprisonment has turned things upside down. Philosophy believes that 
the prisoner is superior to the world, but the prisoner would rather live and 
say that he is of the world, even if that world seems to be unjust. He cannot 
put himself in the position of looking down from heaven, as if he understood 
the world; he takes rather the vertiginous delight in understanding that he is 
not the subject of Philosophy’s lesson but the object of God’s gaze. Freedom 
comes in rejecting Philosophy’s more simple-minded formulations for the 
transcendence of the divine vision, and in that you may see at work in the 
end of Consolation not Crito but Job. 
 Thank you. 
